Inconstitucionalidade da lei 179/2021 e o debate sobre a autonomia do Banco Central do Brasil
Tipo
TCC
Data de publicação
2022-06
Periódico
Citações (Scopus)
Autores
Ivo, Maria Clara de Mello
Orientador
Salgado, Rodrigo Oliveira
Título da Revista
ISSN da Revista
Título de Volume
Membros da banca
Programa
Resumo
O presente trabalho realiza uma discussão a respeito da Lei Complementar 179/2021 de 24
de fevereiro de 2021, que conferiu autonomia ao Banco Central do Brasil, ao defini-lo como
uma autarquia de natureza especial desvinculada de qualquer outro órgão da administração
pública e ao estabelecer mandato fixo para os seus Diretores e Presidente. Faz isso
primeiramente do ponto de vista da forma do processo legislativo, ao defender a existência
de vício de iniciativa na Lei, por ter sido oriunda de Projeto de Lei de iniciativa parlamentar,
embora trate de matéria reservada pela Constituição à iniciativa privativa do Chefe do
Executivo. Ainda, é feito o esforço de contextualizar o debate a respeito da independência
do Banco Central, bem como trazer um breve histórico de mudanças institucionais no
BACEN, consideradas relevantes por este trabalho. Em seguida, analisa a matéria da Lei ao
discutir a incoerência dos objetivos definidos para o Banco Central do Brasil com o projeto
da Constituição Federal de 1988. Por fim, debate a descoordenação da política monetária
com a política fiscal gerada pela autonomia do Banco Central.
This present work discusses the Complementary Law 179/2021 that granted autonomy to the Central Bank of Brazil, by defining it as an autarchy of special nature unlinked from any other body of public administration; by establishing a fixed term of office for its Directors and President; and defining the Bank’s goals. The discussion is done primarily from the point of view of the form of the legislative process, by defending the existence of a defect of initiative in the Law, as it came from a Bill of Law of parliamentary initiative and deals with a matter that the Constitution grants initiative reserved for the Chief of the Executive. An effort is still made to contextualize the debate regarding the independence of the Central Bank, as well as a brief history of some institutional changes in Brazil’s Central Bank, that were considered relevant for this work. It then analyzes the matter of the Law by discussing the inconsistency of the objectives defined for the Central Bank of Brazil with the project of the Federal Constitution of 1988. Finally, it discusses the lack of coordination of monetary policy with the fiscal policy generated with the autonomy of the Central Bank.
This present work discusses the Complementary Law 179/2021 that granted autonomy to the Central Bank of Brazil, by defining it as an autarchy of special nature unlinked from any other body of public administration; by establishing a fixed term of office for its Directors and President; and defining the Bank’s goals. The discussion is done primarily from the point of view of the form of the legislative process, by defending the existence of a defect of initiative in the Law, as it came from a Bill of Law of parliamentary initiative and deals with a matter that the Constitution grants initiative reserved for the Chief of the Executive. An effort is still made to contextualize the debate regarding the independence of the Central Bank, as well as a brief history of some institutional changes in Brazil’s Central Bank, that were considered relevant for this work. It then analyzes the matter of the Law by discussing the inconsistency of the objectives defined for the Central Bank of Brazil with the project of the Federal Constitution of 1988. Finally, it discusses the lack of coordination of monetary policy with the fiscal policy generated with the autonomy of the Central Bank.
Descrição
Trabalho indicado pela banca examinadora para publicação e ao Prêmio TCC
Palavras-chave
Banco Central , autonomia , vício de iniciativa , política monetária , Central Bank , autonomy , defect of initiative , monetary policy