O conflito de interesses nos fundos de investimentos
Tipo
TCC
Data de publicação
2023-06
Periódico
Citações (Scopus)
Autores
Meneguetti, Leonardo
Orientador
Rodrigues, Luiz Gustavo Friggi
Título da Revista
ISSN da Revista
Título de Volume
Membros da banca
Programa
Resumo
Este artigo dedica-se a examinar o fenômeno do conflito de interesses nos fundos de investimento, com destaque para a tensão entre os órgãos administrativos internos e externos. O objetivo principal é compreender como esse fenômeno típico das relações societárias se manifesta no âmbito dos fundos de investimento, através da análise comparativa das características fundamentais de ambos os modelos. Serão identificadas as diferenças mais relevantes entre as sociedades anônimas e os fundos de investimento, de modo a examinar as peculiaridades do conflito em cada um deles. Para tanto, abordaremos temas que estão relacionados ao conflito de interesses como, a governança corporativa que visa uma gestão mais eficiente, transparente e responsável de uma empresa, a qual envolve definições claras de papéis e responsabilidades das partes envolvidas em uma empresa, além disso abordaremos a Teoria da Agência, dos autores Michael C. Jensen e William H. Meckling, a qual busca compreender os conflitos de interesse entre os proprietários (ou acionistas) e os gestores de uma empresa.
This article is dedicated to examining the phenomenon of conflict of interests in investment funds, with emphasis on the tensions between the internal and external administrative entities. The main objective is to understand how this typical phenomenon of corporate relations manifests itself in the context of investment funds, through the comparative analysis of the fundamental characteristics of both models. The most relevant differences between corporations and investment funds will be identified, to examine the peculiarities of the conflict in each one of them. To this end, we will address topics that are related to the conflict of interests, such as corporate governance, which is designed to ensure a more efficient, transparent, and responsible management of a company, involving clear definitions of roles and responsibilities of the parties involved in a company. We will also address the Agency Theory, by authors Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, which seeks to understand the conflicts of interest between the owners (or shareholders) and managers of a company.
This article is dedicated to examining the phenomenon of conflict of interests in investment funds, with emphasis on the tensions between the internal and external administrative entities. The main objective is to understand how this typical phenomenon of corporate relations manifests itself in the context of investment funds, through the comparative analysis of the fundamental characteristics of both models. The most relevant differences between corporations and investment funds will be identified, to examine the peculiarities of the conflict in each one of them. To this end, we will address topics that are related to the conflict of interests, such as corporate governance, which is designed to ensure a more efficient, transparent, and responsible management of a company, involving clear definitions of roles and responsibilities of the parties involved in a company. We will also address the Agency Theory, by authors Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, which seeks to understand the conflicts of interest between the owners (or shareholders) and managers of a company.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
conflito de interesses , fundos de investimentos , sociedades anônimas , governança corporativa , conflict of interests , investment funds , corporations , corporate governance