The collaborative basis of corruption: the dark side of social preferences Bases colaborativas da corrupção: o lado sombrio das preferências sociais

Página do item simplificado
dc.contributor.authorMuramatsu R.
dc.contributor.authorBianchi A.M.
dc.contributor.authorOrlandi K.W.
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-12T19:22:04Z
dc.date.available2024-03-12T19:22:04Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.description.abstract© 2022, Lundiana. All rights reserved.The departure point of this paper is the conjecture that the standard economic explanation of corruption in terms of the principal agent-model is necessary but insufficient to understand why corruption emerges and persists over time. More precisely, this article advances the thesis that reciprocity mechanisms together with heuristics and biases play an important role in the explanation of corrupt choice behaviors. Inspired by available experimental evidence in support of our bold claim, we examine what implications the so-called “behavioral turn to corruption research” might carry for the anti-corruption agenda.
dc.description.firstpage1011
dc.description.issuenumber3
dc.description.lastpage1039
dc.description.volume31
dc.identifier.doi10.1590/0103-6351/6396
dc.identifier.issn1980-5381
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.mackenzie.br/handle/10899/34745
dc.relation.ispartofNova Economia
dc.rightsAcesso Restrito
dc.subject.otherlanguageBehavioral economics
dc.subject.otherlanguageCorruption
dc.subject.otherlanguageExperiments
dc.subject.otherlanguageReciprocity
dc.titleThe collaborative basis of corruption: the dark side of social preferences Bases colaborativas da corrupção: o lado sombrio das preferências sociais
dc.typeArtigo
local.scopus.citations1
local.scopus.eid2-s2.0-85125036746
local.scopus.updated2024-11-01
local.scopus.urlhttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85125036746&origin=inward
Arquivos
Coleções
Artigos de periódico