The collaborative basis of corruption: the dark side of social preferences Bases colaborativas da corrupção: o lado sombrio das preferências sociais
Tipo
Artigo
Data de publicação
2021
Periódico
Nova Economia
Citações (Scopus)
1
Autores
Muramatsu R.
Bianchi A.M.
Orlandi K.W.
Bianchi A.M.
Orlandi K.W.
Orientador
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Título de Volume
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Resumo
© 2022, Lundiana. All rights reserved.The departure point of this paper is the conjecture that the standard economic explanation of corruption in terms of the principal agent-model is necessary but insufficient to understand why corruption emerges and persists over time. More precisely, this article advances the thesis that reciprocity mechanisms together with heuristics and biases play an important role in the explanation of corrupt choice behaviors. Inspired by available experimental evidence in support of our bold claim, we examine what implications the so-called “behavioral turn to corruption research” might carry for the anti-corruption agenda.