A spatial evolutionary version of the ultimatum game as a toy model of income distribution
dc.contributor.author | Alves L.B.V. | |
dc.contributor.author | Monteiro L.H.A. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-03-12T23:52:13Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-03-12T23:52:13Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
dc.description.abstract | © 2019 Elsevier B.V.In the standard ultimatum game, two individuals, usually called the proposer and the responder, must agree on how to split a certain sum of money. The proposer makes an offer. If the responder takes this offer, the money is divided as proposed; however, if the responder rejects it, they receive nothing. In this work, a spatial evolutionary version of this game is used to investigate the income distribution in a society, as a consequence of employer-employee bargaining process. The two main modifications introduced here are: (1)the money does not disappear when an offer is not taken; (2)the survival of the players depends on the acceptance of proposals. There are four kinds of players, because each individual adopts one of two strategies as a proposer and one of two strategies as a responder. By performing numerical simulations, the long-term dynamics is determined and the Gini coefficient is computed in function of the model parameters. The results are interpreted from a socioeconomic perspective. | |
dc.description.firstpage | 132 | |
dc.description.lastpage | 137 | |
dc.description.volume | 76 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.cnsns.2019.02.020 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1007-5704 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://dspace.mackenzie.br/handle/10899/35217 | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation | |
dc.rights | Acesso Restrito | |
dc.subject.otherlanguage | Evolutionary game | |
dc.subject.otherlanguage | Gini coefficient | |
dc.subject.otherlanguage | Spatial game | |
dc.subject.otherlanguage | Ultimatum game | |
dc.title | A spatial evolutionary version of the ultimatum game as a toy model of income distribution | |
dc.type | Artigo | |
local.scopus.citations | 12 | |
local.scopus.eid | 2-s2.0-85062590395 | |
local.scopus.updated | 2024-05-01 | |
local.scopus.url | https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85062590395&origin=inward |