A spatial evolutionary version of the ultimatum game as a toy model of income distribution

dc.contributor.authorAlves L.B.V.
dc.contributor.authorMonteiro L.H.A.
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-12T23:52:13Z
dc.date.available2024-03-12T23:52:13Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.description.abstract© 2019 Elsevier B.V.In the standard ultimatum game, two individuals, usually called the proposer and the responder, must agree on how to split a certain sum of money. The proposer makes an offer. If the responder takes this offer, the money is divided as proposed; however, if the responder rejects it, they receive nothing. In this work, a spatial evolutionary version of this game is used to investigate the income distribution in a society, as a consequence of employer-employee bargaining process. The two main modifications introduced here are: (1)the money does not disappear when an offer is not taken; (2)the survival of the players depends on the acceptance of proposals. There are four kinds of players, because each individual adopts one of two strategies as a proposer and one of two strategies as a responder. By performing numerical simulations, the long-term dynamics is determined and the Gini coefficient is computed in function of the model parameters. The results are interpreted from a socioeconomic perspective.
dc.description.firstpage132
dc.description.lastpage137
dc.description.volume76
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.cnsns.2019.02.020
dc.identifier.issn1007-5704
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.mackenzie.br/handle/10899/35217
dc.relation.ispartofCommunications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation
dc.rightsAcesso Restrito
dc.subject.otherlanguageEvolutionary game
dc.subject.otherlanguageGini coefficient
dc.subject.otherlanguageSpatial game
dc.subject.otherlanguageUltimatum game
dc.titleA spatial evolutionary version of the ultimatum game as a toy model of income distribution
dc.typeArtigo
local.scopus.citations12
local.scopus.eid2-s2.0-85062590395
local.scopus.updated2024-05-01
local.scopus.urlhttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85062590395&origin=inward
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