Freedom of choice and bounded rationality: A brief appraisal of behavioral economists' plea for light paternalism

dc.contributor.authorMuramatsu R.
dc.contributor.authorFonseca P.
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-13T01:07:49Z
dc.date.available2024-03-13T01:07:49Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.description.abstractBehavioral economics has addressed interesting positive and normative questions underlying the standard rational choice theory. More recently, it suggests that, in a real world of boundedly rational agents, economists could help people to improve the quality of their choices without any harm to autonomy and freedom of choice. This paper aims to scrutinize available arguments for and against current proposals of light paternalistic interventions mainly in the domain of intertemporal choice. It argues that incorporating the notion of bounded rationality in economic analysis and empirical findings of cognitive biases and self-control problems cannot make an indisputable case for paternalism.
dc.description.firstpage445
dc.description.issuenumber3
dc.description.lastpage458
dc.description.volume32
dc.identifier.doi10.1590/S0101-31572012000300006
dc.identifier.issn0101-3157
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.mackenzie.br/handle/10899/36794
dc.relation.ispartofRevista de Economia Politica
dc.rightsAcesso Aberto
dc.subject.otherlanguageBehavioral economics
dc.subject.otherlanguageBounded rationality
dc.subject.otherlanguageChoice
dc.subject.otherlanguageFreedom
dc.subject.otherlanguagePaternalism
dc.titleFreedom of choice and bounded rationality: A brief appraisal of behavioral economists' plea for light paternalism
dc.typeArtigo
local.scopus.citations1
local.scopus.eid2-s2.0-84867606313
local.scopus.updated2024-05-01
local.scopus.urlhttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=84867606313&origin=inward
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