O endividamento e a remuneração variável dos diretores executivos no Brasil: evidências empíricas
Tipo
Tese
Data de publicação
2014-11-04
Periódico
Citações (Scopus)
Autores
Merofa, Patricia do Amaral
Orientador
Nakamura, Wilson Toshiro
Título da Revista
ISSN da Revista
Título de Volume
Membros da banca
Formigoni, Henrique
Palmisano, Angelo
Basso, Leonardo Fernando Cruz
Santos, José Odálio dos
Palmisano, Angelo
Basso, Leonardo Fernando Cruz
Santos, José Odálio dos
Programa
Administração de Empresas
Resumo
The purpose of this work is to investigate the relationship between executive compensation
and corporate debt in the Brazilian market. The research is focused on interactions between
capital structure and compensation in the Brazilian public companies listed on the
BM&FBovespa, particularly when they use debt as a disciplining factor on the behavior of
managers to mitigate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. The sample of
234 companies and the information about variable compensation were collected from the
Formulário de Referência, in subsection on remuneration of executive officers. Using panel
data for the period from 2009 to 2012, this empirical study describe the effects that the
variables have on companies debt level. The results confirm the negative relationship
between debt and executive compensation.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
estrutura de capital , remuneração variável , teoria da agência , capital structure , executive compensation , agency theory