A análise econômica do direito e a redução das falhas de mercado pela contabilidade no processo de recuperação judicial

Abstract

This work assumes that the judicial recovery plan of companies is not exempt to incurring the market failures, particularly in the informational asymmetry. Under such approach, we will treat the law and economics with special attention to the neoclassical school and the new institutional economics, focusing our attention in the economic efficiency desired, in order to transport it to the judicial recovery process. Since then, our analysis turns to market inefficiencies that impact in the reorganization plan - especially the information asymmetry - to found that the social function is the catalytic element that justifies the judicial reorganization and should be the first and foremost rule to be target in this process. As a result, this work discuss, from the analysis of the game theory, the strategic behavior of each agent and wich informational level is expected to make decisions, being relevant in this study corporate governance mechanisms available, including the management accounting. At the end, it is believed that the information asymmetry can be best worked in the judicial reorganization proceedings on the basis of management accounting mechanisms, allowing us to demonstrate the economic feasibility of the company.